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As people have become more dependent on information technology, they have also 
become more aware of the potential consequences of attacks to information systems. Computer 
security made front-page news in the 1990s because of the “Y2K problem” and a series of high-
profile viruses and computer hacking cases. To address the threat, the Bush administration 
reviewed cyber security policy and released The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.  
The National Strategy lacks a well-defined assessment of the threat to cyber security and 
does not provide appropriate incentives or any mechanism for accountability. Unfortunately very 
little information for estimating the size of the threat or the effectiveness of measures to combat 
it is available. 
The government should be setting ground rules for a system that provides an efficient 
level of security. It can accomplish this by ensuring that “best practices” are established, using 
regulation where the market has failed, changing liability practices, sponsoring research on the 
costs and benefits of cyber security attacks and protection policies, and learning how to balance 
security and privacy. 
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Cyber Security: Who’s Watching the Store?  
 
Bruce Berkowitz and Robert W. Hahn 
 
 
  As information technology has permeated every niche of the economy and society, the 
public has become familiar with the dark side of the Information Revolution—information 
warfare, cyber crime, and other potential ways nefarious parties might try to do harm by 
attacking computers, communications systems, or electronic databases.  The threats people fear 
range from nuisance pranksters abusing the World Wide Web, to theft or fraud, to a cataclysmic 
meltdown of the information infrastructure and everything that depends on it.   
   As people have become more dependent on these systems and “IT” has become part of 
everyday life, they have become able to imagine how such assaults could have dire – 
conceivably even catastrophic––consequences. This is why during the past decade government 
officials, technology specialists, policy analysts, industry leaders, and the general public have all 
become more concerned about “cyber security”––the challenge of protecting information 
systems.  Prodigious efforts have been expended during this time to make information systems 
more secure.  Yet how much progress has been made?  And, if progress has been slow, what can 
be done to improve the situation? 
Thinking About Cyber Security 
  The threat to information systems potentially takes many forms.  Experts generally offer 
four different “attack modes”: denial, deception, destruction, and exploitation.  Or, to put it 
another way, one can break into an information system to stop it from operating.  One can insert 
bogus data or malicious code to generate faulty results.  One can physically or electronically 
destroy the system.  Or one can tap into the system to steal data.  Experts also agree that such  2
 threats can come from a variety of sources: foreign governments, criminals, terrorists, rival 
businesses, or simply individual pranksters and vandals.  Many  people  associate  cyber 
security with the Internet Revolution of the 1990s.  But, in fact, the idea of “information 
warfare” directed at computer networks dates back to 1976 and a paper written in the depth of 
the Cold War by Thomas Rona, a staff scientist at the Boeing Company.  Rona’s work was an 
outgrowth of electronic warfare in World War II and the introduction of practical computers and 
networks.  He speculated that, in the emerging computer age, the most effective means to attack 
an adversary would be to focus on its information systems.
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  Rona’s research came at a propitious moment, because the Department of Defense was 
itself just beginning to consider whether such tactics might be a “silver bullet” for defeating the 
Soviet Union.  This interest had been triggered, ironically enough, by Soviet military writings.  
The Soviets believed the United States was preparing for radioelektronaya bor'ba––"radio 
electronic combat."   As it turned out, U.S. capabilities were not nearly as far along as the Soviet 
writers feared.  But once U.S. officials discovered that Soviet officials were concerned about 
computer attacks, they began to look into the possibilities more closely.  
  The payoff occurred in the 1991 Gulf War, the first conflict in which U.S. commanders 
systematically targeted an adversary’s command and control systems.   These efforts were an 
important reason contributing to the U.S.-led coalition’s lopsided victory.   But after the war, 
when U.S. officials realized how important this “information edge” had been, they started to 
worry more about the vulnerability of our own electronic networks.  Throughout the early 1990s 
the Defense Department examined this threat more closely.   
                                                 
1 See Rona (1976).   3
  The closer officials looked, the more worried they got.  They were especially worried 
about the vulnerability of U.S. commercial systems, which carry the vast majority of military 
communications.  One of the first unclassified studies was the Report Of The Defense Science 
Board Task Force On Information Warfare––Defense (IW-D), which the Defense Department 
released in November 1996.  This report was followed by other studies that reached similar 
conclusions about the cyber security threat.   
  Largely as a result of these studies, the Clinton administration issued Presidential 
Decision Directive 63 in May 1998.  NSDD 63 directed federal agencies to take steps that would 
make their computers and communications networks (in addition to other critical infrastructure) 
less vulnerable to attack.  It also established (or led to the establishment) of several measures 
intended to address the threat to the commercial sector.  These included: 
•  Appointment of a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and 
Counter-terrorism in the National Security Council staff (the duties of the 
Coordinator included overseeing the development of cyber security policy);  
 
•  Establishment of the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) in the FBI, 
which was responsible for (among other things) coordinating reports of computer 
crime and attacks so that the federal government could respond effectively; and 
 
•  Establishment of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) to 
coordinate the government’s efforts to protect its own vital infrastructure, 
integrate federal efforts with those of local government, and promote the public’s 
understanding of threats.  
 
  Computer security received even more attention in the late 1990s because of the “Y2K 
problem,” or the possibility that at least some computers would fail when their software and 
internal clocks mistook the year “2000” for “1900.”  Also, a series of high-profile viruses (e.g., 
Melissa, Love Bug) and computer hacking cases (e.g., Kevin Mitnick) caught the attention of the 
press.  When combined with the fact that millions of Americans became personally familiar with 
computers (and everything that could go wrong with them), cyber security was transformed from   4
an esoteric topic familiar only to computer specialists and military thinkers to a policy issue of 
concern to the public. 
  The Clinton administration appointed Richard Clarke, a National Security Council (NSC) 
staff member, to the post of National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and 
Counter-terrorism.  Clarke directed the development of the National Plan for Information 
Systems Protection Version 1.0: An Invitation to a Dialogue a 199-page document released in 
January 2000.
2  According to the CIAO, the plan “addressed a complex interagency process for 
approaching critical infrastructure and cyber-related issues in the Federal Government.” 
  The George W. Bush administration agreed with the Clinton administration about the 
importance of cyber security.  The Bush administration began a review of cyber security policy 
when it entered office in January 2001. In October 2001, the administration issued Executive 
Order 13231, which established a new effort for protecting information systems related to 
“critical infrastructure,” e.g. communications for emergency response. 
  The Bush administration also began an effort to develop a new cyber security strategy.  It 
retained Clarke as Special Adviser for Cyberspace Security within the National Security 
Council.  A draft of the new strategy was released to the public in September 2002. The 
administration held a series of public hearings (“town meetings”) among representatives from 
government, industry, and public interest groups during the next several months and released a 
final plan – The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace –in February 2003.
3 
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Is the Current Strategy Effective? 
  The new cyber security strategy consists of five components (which it calls “priorities”).  
These are: 
• A  cyberspace security response system, a network through which private 
sector and government organizations can pool information about 
vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks, such that all parties can take timely 
action; 
 
• A  cyberspace security threat and vulnerability reduction program, consisting 
of various initiatives to identify people and organizations that might attack 
U.S. information systems and to take action to respond appropriately; 
 
• A  cyberspace security awareness and training program, consisting of several 
initiatives to make the public more vigilant against cyber threats and to train 
personnel skilled in taking preventive measures; 
 
•  An initiative to secure the governments’ cyberspace, programs that state and 
federal government agencies will take to protect their own information 
systems; and 
 
•  National security and international cyberspace security cooperation, 
initiatives to ensure federal government agencies work effectively together, 
and to ensure that the U.S. government works effectively with foreign 
governments. 
Although many of these individual initiatives are probably valuable, the approach of the 
current plan––like its 2000 predecessor––lacks at least three features taken for granted in most 
other areas of public policy.  This may be the most fundamental shortcoming of U.S. policy for 
cyber security up to now. 
First, the assessment of the threat––and, thus, the strategy’s estimates of the potential 
costs of inaction––are largely anecdotal.  The strategy also lacks a systematic analysis of 
alternative courses of action.  As a result, the new strategy cannot provide a clear comparison of 
the costs and possible benefits of the various policies it proposes.     6
Second, the strategy lacks a clear link between objectives and incentives.  Economics is 
agnostic, and doesn’t believe people are inherently well-meaning or evil.  Rather, economics 
simply assumes people respond to incentives, and that’s why a clear, rational incentive structure 
is the cornerstone of any effective public policy–which the cyber security strategy lacks.   
In a related vein, the strategy also lacks a component that is closely related to incentives: 
accountability.  There is no mechanism in the policy that holds public officials, business 
executives, or managers responsible for their performance in ensuring cyber security; nor is 
there a mechanism that ensures failure will result in significant costs to the responsible parties.  
Third, the strategy rejects regulation, government standards, and use of liability laws to 
improve cyber security in toto.  These are all basic building blocks of most public policies 
designed to shape public behavior, so one must wonder why they are avoided like a deadly virus 
(so to speak).  
The strategy says it avoids regulation and government-imposed standards to ensure U.S. 
companies can continue to innovate, remain productive, and compete in world markets.  This 
statement, however, overlooks another basic fact about public policy: such policies always must 
reconcile individual profitability and economic efficiency with security, which has some of the 
characteristics of a public good.  It is precisely because there are competing interests that one 
must strike the right balance—not reject such measures completely, as the current strategy does.  
Ideally, the new cyber security strategy would have laid out an analytical framework that 
explained how it selected some options and rejected others.  Instead, the current strategy merely 
gives a laundry list of activities which may be excellent ideas–or a total waste of effort–but 
which bear no relationship to the severity of the threat, and provide no link between proposals 
and priorities.    7
What Is the Need? 
  The most important question to ask in addressing any public policy issue is, “What is the 
problem that needs to be solved?”  Yet, despite all the attention cyber attacks receive in the 
media there is, in reality, little hard data useful for estimating the size of the cyber security 
threat-or, for that matter, how much money is already being spent to counter the threat. 
  The data gap begins with the government.  According to the General Accounting Office 
the amount spent by the federal government on IT security was $.938 billion in 2000, $1.01 
billion in 2001
4, and $2.71 billion in 2002
5. However, the data do not tell us how much is being 
spent on different kinds of security measures. Moreover, there is no way to determine from the 
data whether all government agencies keep track of  IT security spending in the same way. 
  Publicly available data on private IT security spending is, if anything, even less reliable 
and harder to come by. According to the Gartner Group, a leading IT consulting firm, worldwide 
spending on security software alone totaled $2.5 billion in 1999, $3.3 billion in 2000, and $3.6 
billion in 2001.  Once spending on personnel, training, and other aspects of information security 
is considered, total IT security spending could be substantially more.  But the bottom line is that 
neither government nor private sector statistics on IT security spending are terribly useful for the 
kind of analysis that is common in most other policy sectors.  
  The most often-cited source for IT security data is probably the FBI-sponsored survey  
published by the Computer Security Institute (CSI), a San Francisco-based membership 
organization for information security professionals.
6 In 2002, CSI sent its survey to “503 
computer security practitioners in U.S. corporations, government agencies, financial 
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5 See Office of Management and Budget (2002).  
6 See Computer Security Institute (2002).    8
institutions.” The survey asks respondents about security technology they use, the types and 
frequency of attacks they have experienced, and the losses associated with these attacks.  
Needless to say, this is a very small percentage of all computer networks, and hardly a 
scientific sample. Yet the greatest shortcoming of the CSI survey is that it lacks reliable 
procedures for uniformity and quality control.   Each respondent decides for itself how it will 
respond.  One company might estimate financial damages from cyber crime with data from its 
accounting department, using insurance claims and actual write-offs on its balance sheets.   
Another might provide a gut estimate from a systems operator who monitors network intrusions.  
In either case, CSI does not require substantiation.  
Even so, fewer than half of respondents in the 2002 CSI survey (44 percent) were willing 
or able to quantify financial losses due to attacks, which means that the data that are provided 
are almost certainly statistically biased.  This is suggested by the results of the survey, which 
should raise questions even at face value.  For example, survey responses from 1997 to 2002 
indicate that the number of attacks in some categories has been constant or falling, even though 
the number of potential targets during this time grew exponentially.  Similarly, the total cost of 
these attacks soared––despite the fact that companies were more aware of the cyber threat and 
spending more to deal with it.   
In recent years CSI has conceded weaknesses in its approach, and has suggested that its 
survey may be more illustrative than systematic.  Nevertheless, government officials and media 
experts alike freely cite these and other statistics on the supposed costs of cyber crime––though 
many fail even the test of basic plausibility.   
For example, in May 2000, Jeri Clausing of the New York Times reported that the Love 
Bug virus caused $15 billion in damage. Yet the most costly natural disaster in U.S. history––  9
Hurricane Andrew, which in 1991 swept across Florida and the Gulf Coast—caused only $19 
billion in damages.  Moreover, this figure reflected 750,000 documented insurance claims, plus 
tangible evidence of 26 lost lives along with the near-total destruction of Homestead Air Force 
Base and an F-16 fighter aircraft. Are we to believe that one virus has fourth-fifths the 
destructive power of a Class 1 hurricane?  Similarly, in February 2002 during a committee 
hearing, Sen. Charles Schumer (D. -N.Y.) cited a report claiming the four most recent viruses 
caused $12 billion in damage. By comparison, the Boeing 757 that crashed into the Pentagon on 
September 11 only caused $800 million in damages endeavor––and these estimates are based on 
the actual contracts to rebuild the building, which were monitored by the Defense Auditing 
Agency.  Could the four viruses cited by Sen. Schumer really cause 15 times as much damage as 
a fully-loaded airliner?
7 
In reality, analyzing the damage of most network intrusions is time consuming and 
expensive—which is why it has rarely been done on a large scale up to now.  To analyze an 
attack on a computer network, one must review logs and recreate the event.  Even then, 
sophisticated attackers are likely to stretch their attacks over time, use multiple cutouts so a 
series of probes cannot be traced to a single attacker, or leave agents that can reside in a system 
for an extended time—all making analysis harder.  Logically, the trivial attackers are the ones 
most likely to be detected and the sophisticated ones are most likely to go unrecorded. 
  Without an exhaustive research program (which, to date, has not been carried out) the 
exact scope and nature of the cyber threat contains enormous uncertainty.  The current strategy 
proposes to identify threats.  But it does not propose to collect reliable data that would define the 
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(1992).  For the Schumer statement, see U.S. Department of State (2002); and for damage to New York and the 
Pentagon see Tillinghouse-Towers Perrin Reinsurance (2001).   10
threat. This current lack of data is not an argument for ignoring cyber threats.  However, when 
the available data contain this much uncertainty, dealing with the uncertainty of the threat must 
be an integral part of the strategy.  A prudent policy will focus on the most certain threats that 
have high probability and potential costs.  It will hedge against the less certain, less dire threats, 
and include mechanisms that both direct efforts toward those areas with the greatest payoff and 
limit the resources that might be inadvertently spent on wild goose chases.  
  In our view, the greatest threats may simply be the economic harm that would result if 
the public lost confidence in the security of information technology in general.  A threat that is 
only slightly less pressing is the possibility that a foreign military power or terrorist group might 
use the vulnerability of an information system to facilitate a conventional attack.  The possibility 
that a purely electronic attack might cause a widespread collapse of information systems for a 
prolonged period with large costs and mayhem is possible, but a second-order concern, if only 
because potential attackers have other alternatives that are easier to use, cheaper, and more likely 
to be effective in wreaking havoc.   
The Government Role 
  The most significant feature of the role set forth for government in the current cyber 
security strategy is that it arbitrarily precludes the government from taking action common in 
other regulatory domains.   It also defines a role for the government that is dubious at best. 
  For example, the strategy states, “In general, the private sector is best equipped and 
structured to respond to an evolving cyber threat.”  This is also true in other regulatory domains.  
For example, the application of measures for occupational safety is left to the private sector, too.  
There is no government body responsible for issuing grounding straps and face goggles.   
Unfortunately, the strategy ignores a basic fact of regulation: while implementation is left to the   11
private sector, the government has a large role in setting standards, designing regulations and 
enforcing these measures.   
  The strategy goes on to say that the federal government should concentrate on “ensuring 
the safety of its own cyber infrastructure and those assets required for supporting its essential 
missions and services.”  It also says that the federal government should focus on “cases where 
high transaction costs or legal barriers lead to significant coordination problems; cases in which 
governments operate in the absence of private sector forces; resolution of incentive problems . . . 
and raising awareness.”
8 
  Alas, the government itself has a dubious record. As recently as February 2002 the Office 
of Management and Budget identified six common government-wide security gaps. These 
weaknesses included: lack of senior management attention; lack of performance measurement; 
poor security education and awareness; failure to fully fund and integrate security into capital 
planning; failure to ensure that contractor services are secure; and failure to detect and share 
information on vulnerabilities. 
  In other words, more than six years after the Defense Science Board’s IW-D study and 
three years after the government’s first cyber security plan, most government agencies have yet 
to take effective action.  This is hardly an argument for making government the trailblazer in 
security.   
  The reality of the situation is that the government is poorly suited for providing a model 
for the private sector.  Government bureaucracies (not necessarily through any fault of their 
own) have too much inertia to act decisively and quickly, which is what acting as a model 
requires.  Because of civil service tenure, government agencies lack an important engine of 
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change one finds in the private sector, namely the ability to replace people inclined to act one 
way with people who are inclined to act another.   
  Also, government agencies are locked into a budget cycle.   In most cases, a year is 
required for an agency to formulate its plans, a year is required for Congress to pass an 
appropriation, and a year for an agency to implement the plan--at a minimum.  This is why 
government agencies today are rarely at the leading edge of information technology.  There is no 
reason to believe cyber security will be an exception to the rule. 
The Role of Incentives 
  The bulk of the responsibility for “securing the nets” will inevitably fall to the private 
sector, because it designs, builds, and operates most of the hardware and software that comprise 
the nation’s information infrastructure.  This is why the strategy’s determined avoidance of 
regulation and incentives is so misguided. 
  Organizations such as the information security analysis centers (ISACs) that the 
government has encouraged industries to establish are valuable for coordinating action against 
common threats, such as viruses and software holes.  Larger response centers such as the 
Computer Emergency Response Team/Clearance Center (CERT/CC) at Carnegie Mellon 
University can play a similar role for the information infrastructure as a whole. However the 
ownership and operation of the information is simply too diffuse to deal with real-time hacking 
and more serious cyber threats through any kind of centralized organization.  Cyber security is a 
problem requiring the active participation of scores of companies, hundreds of service providers, 
thousands of operating technicians, and millions of individual users.     13
  The most effective way to shape the behavior of this many people is by setting broad 
ground rules and making sure people play by these rules.  Anything else amounts to trying to 
micromanage a significant portion of the national economy via central control.  
  There are two central questions that must be addressed.  First, what kind of incentives 
will be effective at providing additional security?  And, second, how can we begin to design 
systems that will provide an efficient level of security – that is, one that yields a level of security 
where the difference between benefits and costs is maximized? 
Policy Options 
There are a number of options that should be on the table for designing more effective 
cyber security. They include: 
1. Better use of standards by the government and the private sector. The government may 
consider developing standards for software protocols for the future Internet that are more secure.  
These could include, for example, software that limits anonymity or requires “trust relationships” 
in multiple components of a network.  (A trust relationship is one in which a user must identify 
itself and demonstrate compliance with technical standards before, say, she can gain entry to a 
database or use software.) 
 At a minimum, the government should consider playing a more active role than it does 
now in setting standards. Currently government policy is biased against intervening in the 
standard-setting process.  Yet that is exactly what it should be doing when market forces left to 
themselves do not provide sufficient security to the country as whole—which many experts 
believe is the case at present.  It is interesting that, despite the claims of critics who want to 
"keep the information frontier free", the government, in fact, was a main contributor to the 
development of the current Internet–including the processes that resulted in current standards.   14
In addition to developing standards for software that are more secure, the IT industry 
should also consider developing more rigorous security standards for operations and software 
development.  These standards should address both outside threats (e.g., hackers) and inside 
threats (e.g., sabotage and vandalism inside a company).    
After the rise in virus attacks and hacking incidents that occurred in 2000-01, some 
companies (most notably, Microsoft) did announce that they would make security a higher 
priority in the design of their products.  Critics of these efforts have complained that they were 
inadequate, and were often disguises for marketing strategies designed to impede competition.  
Whatever the merits of these criticisms, they illustrate how government could serve as an honest 
broker—if it takes a more active role.  Such standards could be voluntary or enforced through 
regulations. The more important point is to insure that someone establishes "best practices" for 
industry and government that can be flexible for a variety of users, but still provide a legal hook 
for liability.  
2. Better use of regulation. In some cases the government may want to issue regulations 
to establish minimal acceptable security standards for operators and products.  These would be 
cases in which the market has clearly failed and government action is required to address 
situations in which there are inadequate incentives or other factors preventing the private sector 
from developing these standards for itself.   It may also want to develop an approach that 
requires firms to certify that they have complied with industry best practices in their annual 
reports. 
3. Liability. Many computer and software makers have generally fought changes in the 
liability laws. A key argument is that an increase in liability has the potential to reduce 
innovation in the fast-moving information-technology sector. True enough, but only if the   15
changes are poorly crafted or go too far. There is a good economic rationale to consider changes 
in liability that would give software and hardware companies some responsibility, so that they 
have an incentive to increase the amount of attention paid to security issues.  
Liability represents a big step over many of the voluntary measures that are being 
advocated now. However, we doubt that many of these voluntary measures are likely to be 
adequate in addressing the problem. The strength of liability is that it is a market mechanism that 
is much more efficient in shaping the behavior of millions. 
Reforming IT liability is, in effect, a market-style measure to promote better security by 
providing those best positioned to take action with the incentive to do so.  In this same vein, the 
government should consider measures that would require corporations to tell their stockholders 
whether there are significant cyber security risks in their business, and to certify that they are 
complying with industry standards and best practices to address them. 
Clearly, one size does not fit all when it comes to cyber security.  The kinds of measures 
appropriate for a Fortune 500 corporation are probably inappropriate—and ill suited to a start up 
company operating out of a garage.  The best approach is probably to let the market, combined 
with reasonably defined roles of legal responsibility to tailor an optimal solution.  But for this to 
happen, government will need to remove those obstacles that prevent the market from doing this 
currently, and to play a role in those cases in which a “public goods” problem dissuades 
companies and consumers from acting. 
4. Research. Most importantly, we need to recognize that we are largely flying blind at 
this point in a public policy sense, because we have such a limited understanding of the costs of 
cyber attacks and the benefits of prevention policies. The government should sponsor research 
on this subject—research that, up to now, the private sector has been unwilling or unable to   16
conduct.  It should also develop mechanisms for systematically collecting information from 
firms (with appropriate privacy protections) that would allow it to help develop a better strategy 
for addressing cyber security in the future.  
5.  Security and Privacy.  Finally, public officials must learn how to balance privacy and 
security, and public policy analysts must do a better job of explaining the balance between these 
two goals.  Simply put, often technology leaves no practical means for reconciling privacy and 
security.  
For example, a trusted IT architecture, in which only identified or identifiable users can 
access parts of a computer or network –inherently comes at the expense of privacy.  A user must 
provide a unique identifier to gain access in such a system, and this naturally compromises 
privacy.  (And even worse, often the data that a network uses to recognize a trusted user can be 
used to identify and track the user in many other situations.)   
On the other hand, technology that guarantees privacy usually presents some 
insurmountable problems for security.  The classic example is strong encryption.  Because it is 
impossible for all practical purposes to break strong encryption, a person using it can conceal 
their communications, thus ensuring privacy.  But such protection also can make it impossible to 
trace criminals, terrorists, hostile military forces, or others who would attack computer networks. 
One way of addressing this problem is to concede the technical threat to privacy, and use strict 
laws and regulation to compensate.  This, of course, was the idea behind key escrow, which 
government authorities proposed in the mid-1990s as an alternative to completely eliminating 
restrictions on encryption.  Under the proposed system, third parties would hold the “keys” to a 
cipher (actually, the means to break the cipher via a back door).  Under certain specified   17
conditions, the third parties could be ordered to provide the keys. b- do we need a footnote for 
this proposal? 
The U.S. government (in particular, law enforcement and intelligence organizations) took 
an imperious approach to the issue – which proved foolhardy because, in fact, they could not 
control the spread of encryption even if they tried.  At the same time, the IT industry adamantly 
resisted the proposal, arguing that foreign customers would not buy “crippled” American 
software or hardware, and thus opposed any restrictions. In the end, the technology did prove 
beyond control, and the net result was simply soured relations between government and industry 
that remain even today.  
Rather than focusing on whether or not to control a particular technology, society would 
often be better off addressing the consequences that result from the abuse of the technology.  
There are numerous precedents for such an approach. For example, technology allows one to 
track one’s rental records at the local Blockbuster, but laws provide assurances that abuse of this 
ability carries substantial penalties. Similarly, one could require trusted systems in specific 
applications (e.g., financial institutions, critical infrastructure).  Then people could be given the 
choice of whether they wished to use those networks.  Other systems could be non-regulated 
(common e-mail).  Laws could ensure that privacy was protected–and that users who tried to 
enter a system without complying with disclosure requirements were criminally liable. These 
regulations should be enforced in a way that engenders public support. One approach is to have a 
non-political-bipartisan governing body that makes sure government enforces these standards 
and does not abuse its own access to personal data.  
 
   18
Conclusion 
Designing a cyber security policy is not simple. There’s very little good data on the costs 
of cyber security attacks and the benefits of proposed policy measures. The problem is extremely 
complicated because of the IT infrastructure, the large number of users, and the diverse nature of 
potential attackers.  
Addressing this problem will take economic insight and political courage. Given the 
complexity of the problem, we think a variety of policy instruments should be used, including 
voluntary standards, regulation, and liability. The challenge for policy research is to develop 
deeper insights about the precise nature of the cyber security problem and the costs and possible 
benefits of different policy interventions. 
The challenge for politicians is to give more than lip service to this issue.  That means 
taking a leadership role in communicating the importance of the problem and defining a mix of 
government and private sector strategies for dealing with it in a manner comparable to that found 
routinely in other areas of public safety and homeland security.  
At a minimum, funding of serious, comprehensive research on the size of the problem 
and the benefits and costs of policy measures should be relatively non-controversial and 
beneficial. Somewhat harder is educating the public about difficult trade-offs that need to be 
faced. At some point, we are likely to find, for example, that security cannot be enhanced 
without making some sacrifice in other features, such as ease of use and total assurance of 
privacy and anonymity. Such trade-offs should not be swept under the rug, but rather discussed 
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